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SMALL BUSINESS FINTECH LENDING: THE
NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION
Lenore Palladino*
ABSTRACT
The 28.7 million small businesses in the United States—99% of all
American businesses—are the backbone of the American economy.
Historically, small businesses relied on community banks for their
credit needs. Over the last decade, however, small businesses
increasingly have turned to “fintech” lenders—nonbank lenders that
are largely unregulated. Nonbank consumer lending is governed by
consumer protection statutes, but nonbank small business lending is
outside of any clear regulatory framework that would protect
borrowers from potentially predatory practices. This Article argues
that the optimal regulatory regime is a combination of both state
authority over fintech lenders and inclusion of small business
borrowers in federal consumer protection statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
The 28.7 million small businesses in the United States—99% of all
American businesses1—are the backbone of the American economy.2 The
definition of a “small business” varies, but if we consider businesses with
under 500 employees, they employ over half of all American workers and
are drivers of economic prosperity.3 Historically, small businesses relied
on banks—particularly community banks—to fulfill their credit needs.
Over the last decade, small businesses increasingly have been obtaining
credit from “fintech” lenders—nonbank lenders that are largely
unregulated. “Fintech,” or financial technology, refers to technology
firms that provide lending services outside of the traditional regulated
banking context, using algorithmic decision-making processes rather than
traditional credit scores and income verification.4 While the rise of fintech
lenders may open up credit opportunities to new borrowers, their rates and
1. “Small businesses” comprise a generically large category: if defined by all
businesses with fewer than 500 employees, small businesses comprise 99% of all U.S.
businesses and half of the American private-sector workforce. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Inst., Small Business Data Dashboard (Sept. 2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/
corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-small-business-report-dashboard.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3V6-X2PA]. See generally Diana Farrell & Chris Wheat, THE UPS
AND DOWNS OF SMALL BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT: BIG DATA ON PAYROLL GROWTH AND
VOLATILITY (JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., 2017); Mark E. Schweitzer & Brett
Barkley, Is “Fintech” Good for Small Business Borrowers? Impacts on Firm Growth
and Customer Satisfaction (Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 17-01,
2017).
2. Out of 28.7 million small businesses, 5.7 million are Main Street businesses,
small- and medium-size suppliers to larger corporations, and high-growth startups.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Inst., supra note 1. See generally Karen G. Mills & Brayden
McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: Innovation and Technology and the
Implications for Regulations 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-042, 2016).
3. Small businesses are the source of 60% of the net new jobs over the last two
decades. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 3, 14.
4. Though fintech is also growing inside traditional banking institutions as a way
of conducting businesses, this Article focuses on the distinct nonbank entities that
conduct lending, even though many nonbank fintech entities do partner with banks.
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terms are often worse, and satisfaction with the borrowing experience is
lower, as compared to traditional bank borrowing.5 Fintech lending is not
a niche sector; the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
projects that the market could grow up to $122 billion by 2020.6
While non-bank consumer lending is governed by consumer
protection statutes, non-bank small business lending is currently outside
of any clear regulatory framework that would protect borrowers from
potentially predatory practices. 7 The fact that a fintech borrower is
covered by consumer protection statutes when he borrows $100,000 to
remodel his house, but not when he borrows to capitalize his business,
motivates the argument that small business borrowers should be covered
under the consumer protection statutes. Small business borrowers
generally do not have the sophistication of large commercial borrowers
and have more in common with consumer borrowers than with large
businesses.8 The Treasury Department under the Obama Administration
gave support to this perspective: “strong evidence indicates that small
business loans under $100,000 share common characteristics with
consumer loans yet do not enjoy the same consumer protections.”9 Small
business borrowers are not covered under the consumer protection
statutes that require clear disclosure of often-opaque lending terms, and
that allow regulators to hold predatory behavior accountable.10
Fintech lending can, in principle, be a vital new source of credit to
America’s small businesses. Nonbank fintech borrowing increased
because bank lending was severely constricted after the financial crisis,
5. FED. RES. BANKS, 2017 SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: REPORT ON
EMPLOYER FIRMS iv, 18 (2018).
6. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-254, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY:
ADDITIONAL STEPS BY REGULATORS COULD BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS AND AID
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 7 (2018).
7. At least five federal agencies have authority over traditional bank lending, along
with state regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, and the National Credit Union Administration. Letter from Am. for
Fin. Reform, to U.S. Senate (Apr. 14, 2017) (on file with author).
8. See Barbara J. Lipman & Ann Marie Wiersch, Alternative Lending Through the
Eyes of “Mom & Pop” Small-Business Owners: Findings from Online Focus Groups 5
(Fed. Res. Bank of Cleveland 2015).
9. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, Opportunities and Challenges in Online Marketplace
Lending 28 (2016).
10. SPENCER M. COWAN, PATTERNS OF DISPARITY: SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN THE
CHICAGO AND LOS ANGELES-SAN DIEGO REGIONS 30 (Woodstock Inst. 2017).
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especially for the small-dollar loans ($250,000 and under) that small
businesses typically seek.11 Seventy-five percent of loan applications by
small businesses are for amounts under $250,000; 55% are for amounts
under $100,000.12 The ongoing consolidation of the banking sector, in
which larger banks are absorbing community banks, combined with the
decline in small-dollar loan offerings by larger banks, created space in the
last decade for fintech lending to thrive in the small business lending
space. At the same time, technology advances allowed the advent of the
larger nonbank financial marketplace. New firms use alternative data
sources and “big data”-driven algorithms to evaluate creditworthiness.13
What is different about the fintech borrower experience? Unlike
regulated brick-and-mortar banks, fintech firms provide and underwrite
loans online. There are no standardized disclosure requirements or loan
terms. Several studies have shown interest rates to be higher than those of
comparable bank loans.14 There is a risk that unregulated lending to small
businesses could be predatory and unsustainable. 15 Small businesses
report high levels of dissatisfaction with fintech lenders, as compared to
bank lending, particularly regarding transparency of terms and the price
of the loan.16 Credit is a double-edged sword: small and new businesses
need access to credit to survive, but risky credit that small companies
cannot afford, or do not understand the terms of, can be devastating. High
interest payments can drive small businesses into bankruptcy.
A clear regulatory framework has been slow to catch up to the
industry’s growth. As this Article will argue, the optimal regulatory
regime is a combination of state authority and inclusion of small business
borrowers (whose loans are below a certain threshold) in consumer
protection statutes. State regulators should have the ability to regulate
fintech lending to small businesses, building on a robust and diverse set
of state policies governing nonbank financial entities. Alongside state law
11.
12.
13.

See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 5-6.
FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 6.
See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion,
Risk Pricing, and Alternative Information 7 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper
No. 17-17, 2017).
14. See, e.g., id. at 10. See also discussion infra Section III.
15. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 86; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 11-613, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES:
PERSON-TO-PERSON LENDING: NEW REGULATORY CHALLENGES COULD EMERGE AS THE
INDUSTRY GROWS 31 (2011).
16. FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 14.
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and regulatory authority, the consumer statutes that are overseen by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should be updated to
cover small business borrowers below a certain threshold.
An alternate regulatory framework has been proposed by the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OCC proposes creating a
“special purpose nonbank charter,” (the Nonbank Charter Program)
which would allow fintechs to operate nationally pursuant to private and
entity-specific operating agreements with the OCC, rather than under
federal banking law.17 The OCC claims it is authorized to create such a
charter under the National Bank Act (NBA). 18 This proposal is
problematic because it would preempt state law by bringing fintech
lenders under the national banking regulatory scheme, lowering borrower
protections and the authority of state regulators to license and regulate
fintechs in a number of states. This approach is also likely unauthorized
because fintech lenders should not be considered banks under the NBA.
This Article makes the case for regulation of the fintech small
business lending market and proposes a path forward for policymakers
and regulators. Part I outlines the decline in bank lending to small
businesses. Part II documents the rise of the fintech lending industry. Part
III examines fintech lending and borrower outcomes, specifically for
small business borrowers. Part IV focuses on the regulatory alternatives
available for small business fintech lending and their competing
arguments for authority.
I. THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL SMALL BUSINESS LENDING
Small-dollar bank loans to small businesses have been in decline,19
though big bank lending to larger businesses recovered after the financial
crisis. Community banks were small businesses’ traditional lenders, and
the consolidation of the community banking sector has been a core

17.
18.
19.

Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 8, 103.
See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012).
Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 24. A full discussion of the decline of
community banks is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Katy Milani, Community
Banking is Alive, Well: The Three Myths about Dodd-Frank and Community Banks,
ROOSEVELT INST. (June 8, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/community-banking-alivewell-three-myths-about-dodd-frank-and-community-banks/ [https://perma.cc/2Z98-C4
6H].
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challenge for small businesses.20 Even before the financial crisis, small
banks began to lose market share to big banks as economies of scale and
financial deregulation made it harder for small banks to compete on lowmargin loans. 21 This section will explore the downward trend of bank
lending to small businesses and the funding gap that remains.
The number of community banks fell from 14,000 in the mid-1980s
to 5,000 today.22 Even as overall bank assets have risen, the availability
of credit for smaller loans has fallen.23 The downward trend in small loans
began a sharp decline during the financial crisis of 2008.24 According to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the number of bankbased commercial loans of $1 million or less fell every year since 2008,
even while loans to larger businesses recovered.25 New business startups
also declined abruptly during the crisis and have not recovered, 26 and
small businesses faced significant job losses.27
In 2017, less than 50% of small businesses reported receiving the full
amount they applied for in credit across all lenders.28 Karen Mills and
Brayden McCarthy analyzed the small business funding landscape and
found that, even years after the end of the recession, a significant funding
20. See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, SMALL BUSINESS LENDING:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNITY BANKS 5 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi.
2016).
21. See id. at 2.
22. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 5.
23. Id. This finding is not universal; Jagtiani et al. find that mergers involving
community banks did not adversely affect lending to small businesses. See Julapa Jagtiani
et al., The Evolution of U.S. Community Banks and its Impact on Small Business Lending
1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 14–16, 2014).
24. See Jagtiani et al., supra note 23, at 2.
25. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 29.
26. There are numerous explanations, in addition to the credit constraints identified
here, of why small business startups declined that are outside of the scope of this paper.
They include rising student loan debt and a crash in consumer demand.
27. According to Mills and McCarthy:
From the employment peak immediately before the recession through March 2009—
the recession low point for private nonfarm employment—jobs at small businesses
declined about 11%, while payrolls at businesses with 500 or more employees shrank
about 7%, according to the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) database from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. This disparity was even more significant among the smallest
of small businesses. Employment declined 14.1% in establishments with fewer than 50
employees, compared with 9.5% in businesses with 50 to 500 employees, while
overall employment decreased 8.4%.

Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 17.
28. FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 7.
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gap remains, especially for micro loans. 29 As an example, Mills and
McCarthy note that microbusinesses—those with revenues under
$100,000—were half as likely to receive the funding they sought than
firms with over $10 million in revenue. 30 Even though small business
lending by large banks still maintains a high dollar volume, a declining
portion of this lending is going to the loans on the smaller end, or firms
on the newer end, of the spectrum.31
II. THE RISE OF THE FINTECH LENDING INDUSTRY
Fintech lending is a young industry. Before turning specifically to
fintech small business lending, it is useful to understand the evolution of
fintech lending as a whole and how it is different than bank-based lending.
“Fintech” refers to an extremely broad set of activities. Frank Pasquale
divides fintech into “incrementalist” fintech, which utilizes technology to
provide standard financial services, and “futurist” fintech, in which the
entire financial system is remade due to distributed technologies.32 The

29. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 6; see also Karen G. Mills & Brayden
McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: Credit Access during the Recovery and
How Technology May Change the Game 11 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15–
004, 2014).
30. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 41.
31. The shift has been rapid away from bank-driven small business lending in the
startup phase of a firm:
for instance, bank financing was used by just 12.3% of firms that were less than two
years old at the time of the 2014 survey. By contrast, 18.4% of six- to ten-year-old
businesses and more than 20% of older firms used business loans from banks or other
financial institutions to get started. A 2015 survey by seven regional Federal Reserve
Banks found that 58% of firms two years old or younger couldn’t get all the financing
they needed. Just 12.9% of Hispanic-owned firms and 15.2% of black-owned
businesses used a business loan from a bank or financial institution to get started,
compared with 19% of firms owned by whites.

See Ruth Simon & Paul Overberg, Funding Sources Shift for Startups, WALL STREET J.,
Sept. 28, 2016. Lisa Servon provides one illustration of the capital gap facing small
businesses in New York City. She finds that there is a $6 billion unmet demand for
business loans within the small and medium enterprise market, and that more generally
only two-thirds of the demand for such loans is being met in the market. See Lisa Servon
et al., Estimating the Capital Gap for Small Businesses in New York City, J. PUB.
BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 451 (2011).
32. Exploring the Fintech Landscape: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) (written testimony of Frank Pasquale,
Professor of L., U. of Md.).
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GAO defines fintech as the “use of technology and innovation to provide
financial services.”33
For fintech lenders, consumer lending has been the dominant focus
of fintechs, starting with the original peer-to-peer lending platforms like
Lending Club and Prosper, although a minority of lending went to small
business borrowers. 34 Fintech firms have gained market share by
differentiating themselves from traditional lenders in their speed of
response to the prospective borrower, the way they use data, what data
they use, and their ability to extend credit to those who are otherwise
unable to access bank credit. The purpose of fintech lending, as described
by the growing industry, is to expand opportunities for credit and help
borrowers refinance and consolidate credit that may have higher interest
rates, such as credit cards.35
One of fintech’s distinguishing features is how, and how fast, it
makes decisions about who is creditworthy. Most fintech lenders provide
funding decisions within forty-eight to seventy-two hours. 36 To make
decisions, they use data-rich algorithms with unconventional data
sources37 rather than the relationship-based and standard credit variables
that traditional retail banking operations use, such as credit scores and
income verification. In other words, fintech’s innovative use of

33.
34.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 3.
See generally LENDING CLUB, LENDING CLUB STAT. https://www.lendingclub.
com/info/download-data.action [https://perma.cc/PW7H-94 TN] (last visited Nov. 12,
2018).
35. See, e.g., Marketplace Lending Association, The Marketplace Lending
Association Best Practices (Sept. 16, 2018), http://marketplacelendingassociation.org/
industry-practices/ [https://perma.cc/3GXP-BWH9].
36. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 12.
37. Major online lenders such as SoFi and Kabbage claim to not use FICO scores at
all when evaluating borrowers. The president of Prosper, another major lender, said that
“Prosper gets 500 pieces of data on each borrower; the FICO score is just one data
point.” Penny Crosman, Will Fintechs Kill the FICO Score?, American Banker (June 14,
2016) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-fintechs-kill-the-fico-score [https://
perma.cc/RES6-FE5T]. Small business lenders are pulling data from customer
transaction data sources, real-time bank information, Quickbooks, IRS tax returns, and
even reviews of businesses’ products online. For consumer lending, fintech lenders are
using data from utility payments, insurance claims, use of mobile phone and internet, and
other demographic and personal details drawn from social networking sites. The use of
such nontraditional data raises concerns about disparate impact as well as fair lending
violations. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 13, at 7-8.
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nontraditional data allows new borrowers or traditionally unqualified
borrowers to access credit.
While this may be a benefit of fintech, no one can see into the “black
box” of its decision-making.38 Specifically, there could be violations of
equal protection and fair lending laws, and there are numerous concerns
about data privacy, use of data without the prospective borrowers’
consent, and data security. Borrowers do not have any ability to review
and correct data that is used in lending decisions, in contrast to borrowers’
ability to review their credit score data from the credit bureaus.39 Another
challenge from the use of algorithms is the potential for disparate impact,
as facially neutral data may be correlated with protected classes like race
and age.40
The fintech sector is comprised of a wide variety of entity structures
and business models. Fintech has evolved from platforms that served to
connect “peers” to sophisticated firms with institutional investors,
financial institution partnerships, and securitized transactions. 41 Many
fintech firms affiliate with originating depository institutions—such as
Lending Club’s affiliation with WebBank—and there are a variety of
hybrid models being developed. 42 Investors are pouring money into
fintech startups, with almost $14 billion invested in 2016 alone, a 45%
increase in funding in one year.43 The Treasury Department projects that
by 2020, origination volumes could reach $90 billion.44
Mills and McCarthy define three specific fintech business models:
online balance sheet lenders, peer-to-peer lenders, and lender-agnostic
38.

See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
3, 17 (Harv. U. Press, 2015).
39. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 20.
40. See OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN EMANUEL CLEAVER, II, 115TH CONG., FINTECH
INVESTIGATIVE REP. (2018).
41. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 54.
42. A full discussion of the myriad business models is beyond the scope of this paper.
See, e.g., Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 54. There are signs that large banks have
begun a new phase of in-housing or developing robust partnerships to have full fintech
lending capabilities within their institutions. Mills and McCarthy claim that the industry
has reached a new stage of maturity such that traditional institutions, such as hedge funds
and community banks, are engaging in partnerships in order to capitalize on the initial
success of the industry.
43. Aaron Klein, The Coming “FinTech” Revolution, 42 DEMOCRACY J. (Fall 2016),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/42/the-coming-fintech-revolution
[https://
perma.cc/3EAG-VYYW].
44. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 9.
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION
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marketplaces.45 Online balance sheet lenders function similarly to a cash
advance.46 This includes early lenders like OnDeck and Kabbage.47 The
loans are mainly short-term, and repayment is through regular deduction
of a fixed amount of money or a percentage of sales deducted daily from
the borrower’s bank account.48 “Peer-to-peer” lending platforms focus on
consumer borrowing, targeting mid- to near-prime borrowers.49 Backed
by individual investors, these platform companies connect lenders and
borrowers, and make loan decisions through proprietary algorithms. 50
They perform the traditional underwriting functions of evaluating credit
and ability to pay.51 Finally, there are marketplace lenders that serve to
connect prospective borrowers with a variety of lenders with minimal
transaction costs in order to help borrowers find the best loan, but charge
fees as middlemen.52
Since the industry is young and there is no standard dataset, there are
few studies that examine borrower outcomes. Julapa Jagtiani and
Catharine Lemieux explore whether fintech lending lowers the price of
credit for consumers as well as small business borrowers, how the use of
alternate data sources compares to traditional risk factors, and how credit
performance compares to similar bank loans.53 They find that Lending
Club (a major fintech lender) made credit available in geographic areas
that suffered from declining credit supply, as measured by a loss of bank
branches, and areas with highly concentrated banking markets. 54 For
instance, “about 40% of Lending Club consumer loans were made in
communities that had lost at least 5% of their bank branches.”55 Jagtiani
and Lemieux also find that the correlation between Lending Club’s
proprietary loan grades and FICO scores has declined from 80% in 2007
to 35% in 2016, suggesting that Lending Club’s own ‘alternative data’
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 54-55.
See id. at 54.
See id.
Such entities often argue that they are not lenders and therefore not subject to
state licensing and oversight laws. Specific legislation should affirmatively name
Merchant Cash Advance financing entities as lenders and bring them under the scope of
regulation proposed below.
49. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 29, at 48.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 42.
52. See id. at 49.
53. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 13, at 3-4.
54. See id. at 21.
55. See id.
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has become less similar to traditional FICO scores over time.56 Finally,
they find that some fintech borrowers have been able to get lower-priced
credit than they would have been able to from traditional sources; this
analysis is limited to loans made with the purpose of consolidation of
other debt. 57 At the same time, the rate spread differential between
borrowers with A-level loan grades and G-level loan grades (the lowest
level) widened significantly to 20%.58 The analysis found that Lending
Club is charging significantly higher spreads in areas with higher levels
of banking concentration.59
III. SMALL BUSINESS FINTECH LENDING AND BORROWER OUTCOMES
This section discusses the growth of fintech small business lending,
borrower outcomes, and experience. This section also compares fintech
small business lending outcomes with traditional bank lending outcomes.
Jagtiani and Lemieux present data on the growth rate of small business
fintech lenders, while noting that such lending still does not match
aggregate bank lending. 60 They find that fintech lenders have been
growing exponentially over the last decade. The 2017 Federal Reserve
Small Business Credit survey shows a growing rate of small-dollar loans
made by fintech lenders.61 This survey breaks total borrowing by small
businesses into bank and fintech components.62 The survey found that
24% of small firms applied for financing with a fintech lender (up from
21% in 2016) and 71% of those applications were approved for a loan or
line of credit, even while small firms continued to apply to banks for
credit as well (47% applied to small banks for a loan while 49% applied
to large banks). 63 Thirty percent of microbusinesses (those with under
$100,000 in revenue) applied for a fintech loan, while only 6% of firms
with over $10 million in revenue did so; large banks meet 58% of their
credit needs. 64 Medium and high credit risk applicants were most
successful at obtaining credit from online lenders (71%) as compared to
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 25.
See id. at 28.
See id.
See id. at 30.
See id. at 1.
See FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at iv.
See id. at 21.
See id. at iv.
See id. at 21.

88

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

large and small banks (35% and 47%, respectively). 65 These findings
show that fintech lending is concentrated among small businesses and
loans.
How do fintech small business borrowers evaluate their experience?
According to the Federal Reserve’s survey of small business borrowers,
fintech lenders earned just a 35% net satisfaction score from successful
small business borrowers.66 Comparing this to the 74% satisfaction scores
earned by small banks demonstrates the dramatic downward shift in
satisfaction when borrowing from a fintech entity versus a traditional
bank. 67 For online lenders, 52% of successful applicants who were
dissatisfied with their experience cited the high-interest rate, while only
20% and 12% of borrowers cited high interest rates as a concern for large
and small bank borrowing, respectively. 68 Other common reasons for
dissatisfaction with the fintech borrowing experience included lack of
transparency (15%) and unfavorable repayment terms (33%).69
Mark E. Schweitzer and Brett Barkley built on the 2017 Federal
Reserve Small Business Credit survey by conducting a more robust
comparison of online lending and traditional lending to small business
borrowers, focusing on the resulting growth of employment and revenue
as well as borrower satisfaction. 70 First, they found that businesses
applying for fintech loans have characteristics making them more like
firms that were denied financing from other sources than firms that
received bank loans, which suggests that they are riskier borrowers.71
Expectations of growth in revenue and employment are similar, whether
a firm is securing bank or online financing, whereas both are distinct from
firms that were denied financing.72 However, business satisfaction with
financing, which captures both the application process and the financing
terms if they were approved for a loan, is much higher for firms with bank
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at iv.
See id.
See id. at 14.
See id.
See id.
See Mark E. Schweitzer & Brett Barkley, Is “Fintech” Good for Small Business
Borrowers? Impacts on Firm Growth and Customer Satisfaction 1-2 (Fed. Res. Bank of
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 17-01, 2017). Since the survey itself is limited,
Schweitzer and Barkley are able to look at the different impacts of the different categories
of lender through econometric specifications.
71. See id. at 8.
72. See id. at 9.
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loans.73 Schweitzer and Barkley find that “firms with bank financing are
approximately 26.8 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with their
lender(s) than firms with online financing (75% versus 48.2%).”74 This is
likely due to the fact that the terms of online loans are not required to be
disclosed in the same manner as the terms of bank loans. Finally, they
explore the effects on minority-owned firms. Minority-owned firms had
higher satisfaction levels with fintech lenders, but this is explained by the
low satisfaction minority borrowers had with banks to begin with.75
Another way to evaluate the borrowing experience for fintech
borrowers is to take a qualitative approach. The Federal Reserve of
Cleveland ran a series of online focus groups to uncover key issues about
how small business owners are experiencing and interacting with the
small business credit market.76 They found that small business owners
had difficulty comparing credit products, and many were uncertain or
incorrect in answering questions evaluating their options when faced with
choosing among loan products.77 Virtually all participants in the focus
groups said they want transparency of terms, and for loan terms to be
expressed in ways that allow prospective borrowers to more directly
compare loan offers.78
One of the most important considerations for the success of fintech
lending is whether borrowers are paying back their loans at interest rates
that they can afford to ensure that unaffordable interest rates do not drive
them to default. The best evaluation of the efficiency of fintech is how
available, affordable, and fair credit is. Troublingly, 52% of small
business owners who borrowed from fintechs were dissatisfied with the
interest rates on their loans.79
Several studies focus on the experiences of borrowers in a specific
geographic area.80 In one study, Weaver, Donaker Brown, and McShane
present the challenges that arise from “alternative lenders” operating in a

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 10.
Id.
See id. at 11.
See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 105.
See id.
See Lipman & Wiersch, supra note 8, at 16.
FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 14.
ERIC WEAVER, GWENDY D. BROWN & CAITLIN MCSHANE, OPPORTUNITY FUND,
UNAFFORDABLE AND UNSUSTAINABLE: THE NEW BUSINESS LENDING ON MAIN STREET 11
(2016).
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“regulatory void” in California: high-cost loans with opaque terms. 81
Although the sample was extremely limited,82 their analysis found that the
average annual percentage rate (APR) for alternative loans was 94%, with
one loan reaching 358%, far in excess of what is allowed under state usury
laws.83 High rates lead to their next conclusion: that the average monthly
loan repayment is 178% of the net income available to the owners.84 They
also found that more than a quarter of small business borrowers had loans
outstanding with multiple alternative lenders.85 They note that while some
lenders are offering responsible loan products, small business owners
have trouble distinguishing between loans that are useful versus
extractive to their business because there is a lack of requirements for
disclosure or transparency.86
IV. HOW SHOULD FINTECH SMALL BUSINESS LENDING BE
REGULATED?87
This Part will argue that the consumer statutes that regulate lending,
generally at the federal level, should be amended to cover small business
borrowers, with oversight by the CFPB, and that nonbank fintech lenders
should be regulated and licensed at the state level. 88 Small business
81.
82.

Id.
The authors work for the Opportunity Fund, the nation’s largest non-profit
micro-lender to small businesses. The Opportunity Fund refinances unsustainable loans;
thus, their dataset is limited to businesses that approach them for refinancing. Their
dataset was limited to 104 businesses that had applied to them for funding, who had
received 150 alternative loans from 54 different lenders.
83. Weaver et al., supra note 80, at 11.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Other reforms that are beyond the scope of this Article: mandating that loan
brokers operate as fiduciaries; industry-led reforms such as “Small Business Borrowers’
Bill of Rights” which was announced in August 2015, led by Fundera, Funding Circle,
Lending Club, the Aspen Institute, Small Business Majority, Accion, and Opportunity
Fund. See generally Signatories, SMALL BUSINESS BORROWERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS,
http://www.borrowersbillofrights.org/signatories.html
[https://perma.cc/86J6-65MZ]
(last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
88. There is universal agreement that regulatory clarity is needed. The Obama
Administration, research, and industry commentary have pointed out the need for clarity
in the regulatory space, even though they come to different conclusions about the optimal
regulatory structure. It is outside the scope of this Article to look at regulatory changes
for the banking industry, which is developing an increasing scale of partnerships with
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owners largely do not have the financial expertise or professional support
to do a sophisticated analysis of their lending options. The fact that the
vast majority of small businesses apply for loans under $250,000, and the
majority of those apply for loans under $100,000, belies the assumption
that these are “sophisticated” borrowers.89 Eighty-seven percent of small
business owners are relying on their personal credit scores and using
personal collateral to finance their small businesses,90 further blurring the
line between consumer and business borrowing and demonstrating why
protection is essential. The lack of protection of small business borrowers
by the consumer protection statutes creates the opportunity for predatory
lending.91 Entanglement of an owner’s personal credit history and his or
her application for business lending can bring issues of racial
discrimination into the process. Preliminary findings by Representative
Emmanuel Cleaver included that small business owners of color are more
likely to borrow from fintechs and that lenders “appear to be determining
the race of the borrower even when it’s not on the application.”92 Though
it may be difficult to pinpoint the correct threshold at which a small
business owner has enough financial sophistication to be regulated as a
truly commercial borrower from nonbank entities, 93 it is nevertheless
important to consider the option for microbusinesses (businesses under a
certain revenue threshold) and startup entrepreneurs.
This Part considers the various regulatory alternatives available to
appropriately govern the growing industry. It is crucial for state regulators
to retain authority over fintech lenders (to both consumers and small
businesses) in their states. At the federal level, consumer protection
fintech lenders. Because the bank regulatory universe is already so complex, it requires
a different set of considerations. New issues arise when the issuer of loans is partnering
with a depository institution that faces standard bank regulation. However, many
originating institutions pass loans off within a few days, thus transferring the risk back to
the fintech entity and with it any regulatory oversight. FDIC issued guidance on such
relationships but did not clarify how it would coordinate with other agencies. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 6-7.
89. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 3.
90. See FED. RES. BANKS, supra note 5, at 5.
91. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 86.
92. Ian McKendry, Are Fintechs Charging Minorities More for Business Loans?,
AM. BANKER (Oct. 16, 2017) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are-fintechscharging-minorities-more-for-business-loans [https://perma.cc/Z3UT-WV3Y].
93. One starting proposal would be to include all loans under $250,000 in the newlyrevised statutes. However, pinpointing an exact threshold must be subject to empirical
analysis and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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statutes should be amended, and the CFPB should be granted rulemaking
authority for the small business lending market. State regulators currently
regulate nonbank lending in a variety of forms, such as mortgage lenders
and payday lenders, and there are policies under development in several
states to focus specifically on fintech lending, as described below. 94
Finally, this Part considers the alternate regulatory framework proposed
by the OCC: the Nonbank Charter Program, in which the OCC issues a
“special purpose” nonbank charter that fintechs can apply for in order to
harmonize fintech lending and bank lending regulation. This proposal is
not optimal principally because it would preempt state authority and leave
borrowers still uncovered by core consumer protection statutes. Secondly,
it is likely outside of the OCC’s authority, as fintechs should not be
considered banks under the NBA because they are not depositories. These
arguments are described in detail below.
A. AMENDING CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES TO
INCLUDE SMALL BUSINESS BORROWERS
Congress should enact clear borrower protections for small business
borrowers by expanding the core federal consumer protection statutes to
cover small business loans. In conjunction, Congress should formally
expand the CFPB’s jurisdiction over small business lending. One statute
that should be amended is the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),95 which can
be amended to cover all borrowers under a certain threshold,96 regardless
of the purpose of such borrowing. Other key statutes to amend include the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA),97 Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA), 98 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 99 and the Credit
Practices Rule of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Act. 100 With the exception of the ECOA, the laws do not cover
commercial borrowers, whether small or large businesses, because
94. See, e.g., S.B. 2865, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID=SB&DocNum=2865&GAID=13&SessionID=88
&LegID=96183 [https://perma.cc/QW5T-UVHF].
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (2012) (limiting coverage to lending to individuals
“primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”).
96. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the appropriate threshold.
97. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 93-94.
98. See id. at 94.
99. See id.
100. See FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R § 444 (2018).
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commercial borrowers are presumed to be sophisticated borrowers. And
even though commercial borrowers are covered under the ECOA, data is
not yet formally collected, so disparate impact claims cannot be
evaluated.
The TILA requires lenders to provide fair and accurate loan cost
information to allow borrowers to compare loan terms, bans advertising
practices that are deemed deceptive or misleading, and gives borrowers
the right of rescission (cancellation of the loan) for three days.101 The
TILA currently excludes business credit from its disclosure requirements;
it applies to home loans, student loans, credit cards, and other consumer
borrowing. 102 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)103 granted rulemaking authority under
TILA to the CFPB. Amending the TILA to bring small business
borrowing from nonbank institutions under the protection of the law
would secure the ability of small business owners to obtain clear
information on potential loans. Some industry insiders may argue that
requiring such uniform disclosure would stifle innovation and hurt access
to credit, while others in the industry are currently promoting similar
disclosure outcomes and comparable loan information in their own selfregulating industry proposals.104
Congress should amend the CFPB’s jurisdiction to give it explicit
authority over the small business lending marketplace, in order to allow
the CFPB to take enforcement actions for noncompliance with the
consumer protection laws once it is amended to include small business
loans. The core jurisdiction of the CFPB, as authorized by the Dodd-Frank
Act, is over financial products that are “offered or provided for use by
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”105 This
prevents the CFPB from using its authority to deal with predatory
behavior that confronts businesses. The CFPB does have supervisory
authority over a variety of non-depository financial institutions, such as
payday lenders, student loan providers, mortgage lenders and servicers,
as well as “larger participants” in the consumer lending market

101.
102.
103.
104.

See 15 U.S.C. 1635 (2012).
See 15 U.S.C. 1602 (i) (2012).
See Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
See Small Business Borrowers’ Bill of Rights, SMALL BUSINESS BORROWERS’
BILL OF RIGHTS (2015), www.borrowersbillofrights.org [https://perma.cc/2KSRMB2Y].
105. See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(5)(A) (2012).
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generally.106 The scope of the CFPB’s jurisdiction could be defined to
include any transaction for which the borrower is personally liable,
regardless of the purpose of the loan. Or, it could be defined to cover small
businesses taking out small loans, by creating a threshold for businesses
based on the number of employees or the size of the loan. Former CFPB
Director Richard Cordray supported the expansion of the CFPB’s
jurisdiction to include small businesses. In a March 2016 hearing,
Cordray said:
If I had my way—I don’t have my way on many things—we would
do what I did when I was Ohio attorney general and seek to protect
not only individual consumers as our statute authorizes us to do, but
also small businesses who often operate in the marketplace with no
greater clout than an individual household does. If the Congress sees
fit to give us that authority, we will aggressively pursue that. And it
would help small businesses across the country.107

One immediate step for the CFPB is to implement Section 1071 of
the Dodd-Frank Act, which is meant to allow the CFPB to collect data on
small business lending.108 Although Regulation B of the ECOA prohibits
discrimination in business credit transactions generally, it does not
provide a mechanism for determining if discrimination is taking place.109
Section 1071 was intended to solve that by giving the CFPB the authority
to collect data on small business borrowing by amending the ECOA to
require the CFPB to collect data on credit applications by women-owned,
minority-owned, and small businesses.110 Section 1071 requires statistics
on the type, purpose, and amount of loans applied for as well as what was
approved, the type of action taken with respect to such applications, and
other demographic information about prospective borrowers.111 Although
“the CFPB initially stated that it [would] act ‘expeditiously’” to put such

106.
107.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (2012).
The Semi-Annual Report of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Financial Services, 114th Cong. 17 (2016) (statement
of Richard Cordray, former CFPB Director).
108. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 31.
109. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 38.
110. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 31.
111. See id.
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rules into place, no significant progress has been made.112 Because the
personal characteristics of the business owner are considered but there is
no process to deal with discriminatory bias, it is possible that some of the
challenges in the consumer sector are active in the small business
borrowing sector as well. 113 Additionally, the algorithms that fintech
firms are using have not been evaluated for their potential discriminatory
impact.114 The necessary approach is to fully implement Section 1071 and
then conduct rigorous analysis of the data.115
The Credit Practices Rule, promulgated under Section 5 of the FTC
Act, should also be amended to cover small business loans.116 The FTC
Act prohibits “unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce” and applies to both consumer and business transactions.117
The Credit Practices Rule affords further consumer protection against
abusive terms and conditions in credit contracts, including from nonbank
lenders such as fintechs.118 As FTC Chair Edith Ramirez stated at an FTC
marketplace lending forum in June 2016:
In light of the FTC’s broad jurisdiction over non-bank financial
entities and our decades of experience enforcing consumer lending
laws, we want to ensure that consumers are treated fairly when they
navigate this changing landscape. This includes ensuring that the same
protections consumers have in traditional lending contexts also apply
to marketplace lending.119

The FTC, however, has not yet taken steps to bring small business
borrowers under the coverage of the Credit Practices Rule.120 The Credit
Practices Rule covers loans made to consumers who purchase goods or

112. See id. at 31-32, nn. 49. Section 1071 was one of the few provisions in DoddFrank without a statutory deadline and has been delayed as a result. Congress should
place a new deadline on its issuance.
113. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 9, at 38.
114. Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 93.
115. To this end, the CFPB should additionally expand and make accessible its
Consumer Complaints Database to small business borrowers.
116. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 36.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
118. See Mills & McCarthy, supra note 2, at 92.
119. See id. at 50 (quoting Edith Ramirez, Chairman, FTC, Opening Remarks of FTC
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez FinTech Forum Series: Marketplace Lending 3 (June 9,
2016)).
120. See id. at 86.
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services for personal, family, or household uses.121 This Rule could be
amended to cover loans made to consumers for business purposes that are
secured by personal collateral or that are under a certain size threshold.
B. STATE REGULATION AND LICENSING OF FINTECH LENDERS
States are the primary regulators of nonbank financial entities. All
states require lending licenses for consumer lenders, though some limit
what type of consumer lending must be licensed. 122 State financial
regulators oversee nearly five thousand state-chartered banks and have
the authority to regulate non-depository financial institutions that perform
a range of functions in a range of markets, though state regulation was
preempted for a set of financial institutions before the financial crisis.123
The Coalition of State Banking Commissioners (CSBS) claims that
Congress intentionally reserved the licensure and supervision of nondepository financial institutions to the states rather than pass federal
chartering laws. 124 States, as part of their process for licensing nondepository institutions, evaluate their safety and soundness requirements
and conformity to consumer protection statutes.
States have different legal regimes governing nonbank lending.
Many states have laws that cap interest rates (state usury caps) and
provide fair-lending protections.125 This makes state regulators, and state
law, best suited to evaluate the suitability of a fintech lender’s program
for the potential borrowers of a given state. Some states require nonbank
lenders to obtain a license if they are issuing loans to borrowers in that

121.
122.
123.

See id. at 92.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6, at 36 n. 86.
State law has been preempted in the past by OCC preemption determination
letters, although the OCC’s preemption of state supervision of national bank operating
subsidiaries was repealed in the Dodd-Frank Act. See generally Pub. L. No. 111-203,
supra note 103.
124. See Letter from John W. Ryan, President & CEO, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, to Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Legis. and Reg. Activities
Division, (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/CSBS%20
Comment%20Letter—OCC%20White%20Paper-Exploring%20Special%20Purpose%
20National%20Bank%20Charters%20for%20Fintech%20Companies_0.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/8FJN-EDAE] [hereinafter CSBS Letter].
125. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, USURY, https://www.nclc.org/issues/
usury.html [https://perma.cc/YR65-6TEG] (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (providing
additional information on state usury laws).
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state, and some states extend this requirement to small business lending.126
Interest caps have been shown to be one of the simplest and most effective
ways to protect borrowers from unaffordable loans.127 The removal of this
protection for fintech borrowers could cause an explosion of high interest
rates. Many states provide greater fair-lending protection than do federal
laws and provide privately enforceable protections against unfair and
deceptive lending practices.128
As fintech lending has grown, some states and municipalities have
taken it upon themselves to develop new regulations to govern the
practices within their state. Illinois, led by the City of Chicago’s
Treasurer, has proposed licensing small business lenders, and proposed
SB 2865, which would require lenders to disclose the APR of any
prospective loan as well as the fees they charge, mimicking the
requirements under the TILA.129 The bill would also require lenders to
126. California, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont require nonbank
small business lenders to obtain licenses as well. See Jagtiani & Lemieux, supra note 20,
at 16.
127. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDA) allows federally insured state-chartered banks to use the interest rate limit
imposed by their home state rather than the limit imposed by the state in which the loan
is made. See generally Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221 (1980). The
National Bank Act (NBA) extends this more broadly to all national banks. However, a
recent federal appeals court decision, Madden v. Midland Fund, LLC, held that the
National Bank Act does not preempt state interest rate caps once a national bank sells the
loan to a third party. 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015). This has created uncertainty for
holders of bank-originated assets, including marketplace lenders who originate loans
through a bank. Indeed, the decision broke with a longstanding doctrine that a loan
originated by a bank that was “valid when made” does not lose its preemption status when
the loan is sold to a nonbanking entity. The U.S. Solicitor General, in a joint brief with
the OCC, called the decision “incorrect,” but argued that the Supreme Court should not
hear the case, given the possibility that Midland Funding (the third party holding the loan)
might win the case upon remand. In June 2016, the Supreme Court indeed declined to
hear the case. Madden v. Midland Fund, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016).
128. See generally Complaint, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:18-cv-02449 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2018) [hereinafter
Complaint 2018].
129. S.B. 2865, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/
BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID=SB&DocNum=2865&GAID=13&SessionID=88&LegID=9
6183 [https://perma.cc/QW5T-UVHF]; Small Business Financial Institute, State of
Illinois Turns its Sites on Online Lenders, ADVICE ON LOAN, https://www.sbfi.org/stateof-illinois-turns-its-sights-on-online-lenders
[https://perma.cc/HGE3-HHSG]
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2018).

98

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

determine the borrower’s ability to repay before approving the loan.130
Chicago’s Treasurer, taking the initiative to look at small business
lending, found that there were no preexisting regulatory solutions.131 The
city drafted regulations for business-to-business products that focused on
transparency.132
New York has proposed similar licensing legislation, which would
amend Section 340 of the Banking Law to add the requirement that a
lender must be licensed to lend to either an individual or business for loans
of $50,000 or less and expand the licensing requirement to entities that
acquire loans from others.133
In addition to state legislation, the CSBS (the umbrella organization
for state banking regulators) has adopted its own process to support state
regulation of fintech lenders. In response to the OCC’s Nonbank Charter
Program Proposal (discussed infra), the CSBS has issued Vision 2020, a
series of initiatives intended to streamline the process for regulation
across states of fintech lending.134 The stated goal is that by 2020, “state
regulators will adopt an integrated, 50-state licensing and supervisory
system, leveraging technology and smart regulatory policy to transform
the interaction between industry, regulators and consumers.” 135 The
CSBS’s redesign of the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (NMLS)
130. Small Business Financial Institute, State of Illinois Turns its Sites on Online
Lenders, ADVICE ON LOAN, https://www.sbfi.org/state-of-illinois-turns-its-sights-ononline-lenders [https://perma.cc/HGE3-HHSG] (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
131. See Emily Robbins, Illinois May Be the First State in the Nation to Regulate
Predatory Small Business Lenders, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES: CITIESSPEAK (Apr. 15,
2016), https://citiesspeak.org/2016/04/15/illinois-may-be-the-first-state-in-the-nationto-regulate-predatory-small-business-lenders/ [https://perma.cc/J2TL-8GMM].
132. See Liz Farmer, Are Predatory Business Loans the Next Credit Crisis,
GOVERNING THE STATES AND LOCALITIES: FINANCE (May 2015), http://www.governing.
com/topics/finance/gov-predatory-business-loans-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/CU5P-W
P3L].
133. Jonathan L. Pompan et al., Proposed Change in New York Law Would License
Fintech Loan Platforms, VENABLE LLP (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.venable.com/
proposed-change-in-new-york-law-would-license-fintech-loan-platforms-03-02-2017/
[https://perma.cc/397G-3XUA].
134. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, CSBS Announces Vision 2020 for
Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation (May 10, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/csbsannounces-vision-2020-fintech-and-non-bank-regulation [https://perma.cc/EW9Q-BB
EK].
135. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, Vision 2020 for Fintech and NonBank Regulation (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/vision2020 [https://perma.cc/8N
C4-WUD4].
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is an attempt to streamline the multistate registration process and work
toward uniformity in regulatory requirements where possible. 136 The
NMLS will allow for one point of entry for registration and allow states
to rely on the analyses from other states to more quickly engage with a
fintech firm.
C. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
SPECIAL PURPOSE NONBANK CHARTER PROGRAM
An opposing regulatory framework is the OCC’s Nonbank Charter
Program,137 in which the OCC would issue a special purpose bank charter
for fintech companies that the OCC claims would “harmonize” the entry
of these new unregulated firms into the marketplace, but would also
preempt fintechs from state regulation.138 As of October 2018, the OCC
Comptroller Joseph Otting stated publicly that it is in discussions with,
and vetting, several companies who are seeking such a charter.139 One key
problem with this proposal is the preemption of state law and the impact
on the interest rate provision that would apply if fintech firms become
nationally chartered, rather than state-licensed, entities. 140 Fintech
companies would be able to act like national banks and import interest
rates from their home state to all states where they do business. 141
Presumably, therefore, fintechs would incorporate in states where interest
rate limits are nonexistent. Other concerns include the fact that state
136. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, State Regulators Take First
Step to Standardize Licensing Practices for Fintech Payments (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-licensing-practicesfintech-payments [https://perma.cc/Y7UV-F4VA].
137. See generally Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Supporting Responsible
Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An OCC Perspective (Mar. 2016) [hereinafter
OCC Perspective].
138. The OCC announced that it would begin accepting National Bank Charter
Applications from Financial Technology Companies on July 31, 2018. See OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (Jul. 31, 2018).
139. Complaint 2018, supra note 128, at 6.
140. See Letter from Lauren Saunders, Associate Director of the Nat’l Consumer L.
Ctr. to Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency 7 (May
31, 2016).
141. See generally Charles M. Horn & Melissa R. Hall, The Curious Case of Madden
v. Midland Funding and the Survival of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine, 21 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1 (2017).
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preemption would remove the ability of state regulators to directly license
fintechs, and that the agreements that the OCC would make with a
chartered fintech would remain private, excluding the fintech from public
accountability.
The OCC has framed its policy as a mechanism to promote consistent
application of laws and regulations among banks and fintech companies,
and to make the federal banking system stronger by bringing fintech
companies under the same framework as national banks.142 The Nonbank
Charter Program would allow the OCC to hold fintech entities to “the
same rigorous standards of safety and soundness, fair access, and fair
treatment of customers that apply to all national banks and federal savings
associations.” 143 In other words, the Nonbank Charter Program would
“mak[e] certain that institutions with federal charters have a regulatory
framework that is receptive to responsible innovation along with the
supervision that supports it.”144 The OCC defines responsible innovation
as: “[t]he use of new or improved financial products, services, and
processes to meet the evolving needs of consumers, businesses, and
communities in a manner that is consistent with sound risk management
and is aligned with the bank’s overall business strategy.”145 One principle
of responsible innovation clarifies that it includes “fair access to financial
services and fair treatment of consumers.”146
Establishing the Nonbank Charter Program provides a route for
entities to apply, but the OCC must still go through an approval process
for each applicant.147 The OCC proposed creating “operating agreements”
with each fintech, which would be confidential.148 The OCC could choose
to impose specific requirements on uninsured special purpose banks, but
it is unclear whether there would be any measure of public accountability
for the operating agreements.149 The agreements would, in theory, create
142.
143.
144.
145.

See OCC Perspective, supra note 137.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5; see also id. for a further discussion of the “Guiding Principles for the
OCC’s Approach to Responsible Innovation”.
146. Id. at 5.
147. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
LICENSING MANUAL DRAFT SUPPLEMENT: EVALUATING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (2017) (providing a full description of the approval
process).
148. See id.
149. See id.
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a set of private laws that apply to those entities, but both application and
enforcement would be impossible to monitor because the agreements
would be confidential. There would be no way to assure that any rules
would be applied in a uniform or impartial manner.
The OCC claims to have the authority to regulate fintechs as banks
because fintechs engage in lending, one of the core banking activities
under the NBA and Home Owners’ Loan Act.150 According to the CSBS,
however, it is unsettled whether the NBA allows for a special purpose
designation for financial entities that do not collect deposits without
specific authorization by Congress. 151 The CSBS sued the OCC and
Comptroller Tom Curry in April 2017 to enjoin the OCC from creating
the Nonbank Charter Program on the grounds that the OCC would be
going “far beyond the limited authority granted to it by Congress under
the NBA and other federal banking laws.” 152 Although the case was
dismissed because the OCC had not yet affirmed it would issue charters,
the CSBS filed suit again on October 25, 2018. 153 The case turns on
whether the Nonbank Charter Program as understood would be for
entities that truly are in the “business of banking,” as the OCC claims.154
The CSBS claims that the “business of banking” requires, at a minimum,
engaging in receiving deposits.155 Absent congressional authorization for
a certain kind of bank that does not meet the qualifications of the business
of banking, the CSBS claims the OCC’s Nonbank Charter Program is
unlawful.156 There have been examples of attempts by the OCC to charter

150. See National Bank Act, supra note 18, at 23, 25; see also Pub. L. No. 111-203,
supra note 103.
151. See Complaint 2018, supra note 128, at 4.
152. Complaint at 2, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:17-cv-00763-JEB (D.D.C. 2017) [hereinafter
Complaint 2017].
153. See Memorandum Opinion regarding the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No.
1:17-cv-00763-JEB (D.D.C. 2017); see also Complaint 2018, supra note 128.
154. See Complaint 2018, supra note 128, at 4.
155. Complaint 2017, supra note 152, at 3. The lawsuit also focuses on an alleged
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act by the OCC, which is beyond the scope of
this Article.
156. Complaint 2017, supra note 152, at 3. Congress has authorized several special
purpose banks that do not engage in deposit-taking: trust banks, bankers’ banks, and
credit card banks. Id. at 12.
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institutions that were not in the “business of banking” per this definition,
which were found to be unlawful.157
The NBA authorizes a special purpose national bank to conduct
business nationally without being subject to state banking laws.158 Under
the NBA, core banking activities are defined as receiving deposits, paying
checks, and lending money. 159 The question raised in the CSBS’s
complaint is whether an entity should be considered a bank if it engages
in any one of these core activities, or if it needs to, at a minimum, accept
deposits in order for the OCC to have the authority to designate the entity
as a special purpose bank.160 Congress mandates designated entities that
do not take deposits as special purpose banks, such as bankers’ banks and
trust banks, but it is unclear whether the OCC can take this step on its
own. The OCC’s approach has been to view the NBA as allowing for new
kinds of activities that fall within the broader scope of the business of
banking. In describing how it would approach the Nonbank Charter
Program, the OCC claims that it would consider the “permissibility” of
new activities on a case-by-case basis.
How is the “business of banking” defined? The answer can be found
by looking at what makes an entity cross the line into needing a banking
charter rather than remain a nonbank entity. The CSBS claims that this
line is crossed when an entity receives deposits, because then its business
becomes a public concern.161 The OCC claims that because fintechs lend
money, which is one of the three core functions of banking, they fall
within its purview.162 The CSBS explains the confusion that would be
157. Two federal courts struck down the OCC’s attempts to charter institutions that
were not engaged in the business of banking, holding that the OCC’s chartering of
special-purpose institutions exceeded the limits of its chartering authority. See Indep.
Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Conover, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22529, at *34-36 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 15, 1985) (holding that special purpose “nonbank banks” are unlawful); see also
Nat’l State Bank of Elizabeth v. Smith, No. 76-1479 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 1977) (holding that
special purpose trust banks were unlawful prior to Congress’s specific grant of statutory
authorization for such institutions), rev’d on other grounds, 591 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1979).
Congress then authorized narrowly drawn amendments to the National Bank Act. In each
case, Congress gave the OCC a carefully limited authority to charter a narrowly defined
category of limited-purpose financial institutions, as shown by 12 U.S.C. §§§§ 27(a),
27(b), 1841(c)(2)(D), and 1841(c)(2)(F) (2012).
158. Complaint 2018, supra note 128, at 14.
159. See id. at 18.
160. See id.
161. See CSBS Letter, supra note 124, at 2.
162. See id.
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created if fintech entities became true special purpose banks: since they
would not have full-service charters, most banking laws, such as the Bank
Holding Company Act, would not apply to them. 163 Would they be
required to be Federal Reserve members? What would be their role in the
payment system? One alternative is that the OCC could, as a condition of
the charter, impose either adherence to state usury caps or follow the
Military Lending Act and impose a 36% cap.164 The CSBS claims that the
OCC is overstepping its authority in this regard as well because
preemption authority must come from Congress.165 The CSBS believes
that “the OCC has intentionally structured the special purpose nonbank
charter to evade the application of certain federal banking laws.”166
Another approach recommended by advocates is that the OCC
Nonbank Charter Program could require that fintechs have “financial
inclusion” plans and establish Community Reinvestment Act-like
obligations for fintechs.167 The OCC could also require fintechs to use
debt-to-income ratios that do not exceed a certain threshold. In sum, the
OCC proposal is problematic for two distinct reasons: 1) it would not
increase borrower protection from predatory practices, and 2) it may be
unlawful because fintechs should not be considered banks under the
National Bank Act.
CONCLUSION
To best protect small business borrowers, nonbank lending to such
borrowers should be included in the federal consumer protection statutes,
and the small business lending market should be placed under the CFPB’s
jurisdiction. There is also ample reason to support robust state-level
fintech regulation. Small businesses require access to credit and are the
backbone of the American economy. In order for fintech lending to small
businesses to support future American prosperity, a new framework is
necessary.

163.
164.
165.

See id.
See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2012).
The CSBS claims in its lawsuit that the OCC’s program would thus violate the
Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See
Complaint 2017, supra note 152, at 4.
166. CSBS Letter, supra note 124, at 3.
167. NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, Comments on White PaperExploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (Jan. 2017).

